an individual either needs help or is in a position to offer it (at some cost to herself). The state of needing help occurs with independent and identical probability, and is observable. Individuals needing and providing help are matched according to a fixed matching technology. The cost of providing assistance is always positive, and depends on two components: the proportion of people in the community who need help, and an idiosyncratic cost shock which is privately observed by the individual who is being asked to help. At any period and for any state, agents who are asked to provide help may default on their commitment, and mutual help arrangements need to be self-enforcing. Second, we propose a new concept to study self-enforcing arrangements in groups and networks, that we label fragility. The existing literature (for example Coate and Ravallion, Kocherlakota or Ligon, Thomas and Worrall) considers self-enforcement as an all-or-nothing concept. Either a group norm is fully sustainable in every state, or the norm is deemed unstable. When all information is perfectly available, this is often without any loss of generality: norms that that achieve results in some states may be suitably slackened in other states to avoid deviations. When there is private information -as there is here regarding the costs of rendering assistance -matters are different. A stationary norm may work fine in some states but not in others. We define the degree of fragility of the norm as the overall probability of states in which some self-enforcement constraint fails.
1

I. Mutual Help in Groups
We consider a society with n identical individuals. Let p denote the probability that a person needs help. Call such a person a potential receiver and the remaining individuals (potential) donors. Receivers and donors are matched according to a fixed matching technology. If a proportion q of the community is in need of help, then a given fraction d(q) of randomly chosen potential donors is enlisted to provide that assistance to another given fraction r(q) of randomly chosen receivers. Let c(q, α) be an individual donor's cost of helping, where c is continuous in both q and α, a private cost shock. Without loss of generality suppose that c is nondecreasing in α. Assume that α is independently drawn from some continuous distribution and that for every q > 0, min α c(q, α) > 0. We assume that if help is given, it implies an indivisible benefit of b. Providing help is always socially optimal, that is r(q)b − d(q) max α c(q, α) > 0 for all q.
This abstract model accommodates two important special cases. If help is indivisible, a donor can only provide help to a single recipient, and r(q) = d(q) = min{1, (1 − q)/q}, and c = α is independent of q. If help is divisible, all donors provide help to all recipients, and r = d = 1, and c = q 1−q α is increasing in q.
If everyone abides by the social norm at every date, it is very easy to calculate the expected value of membership in this community as
where p(k, n) is the probability that k needs are realized within n people.
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We consider social norms such that v(n) is increasing in n. There is nothing particularly remarkable about this assumption. It says that larger communities can pool their resources better (ex ante) when it comes to acts of reciprocity. It is easy to verify that this is indeed the case for our two examples.
II. Stability and Fragility
Whether a social norm can be enforced or not depends on the assumptions made on the behavior of the agents following a deviation. First, one may distinguish between situations where individuals deviate and situations where groups of agents deviate. In the first case, after refusing to provide help, an agent is ostracized and obtains his autarky payoff, denoted v(1). In the second case, after they deviate, the group of agents can still form a smaller subgroup, and obtain a payoff v(s), where s denotes the size of the stable subgroup formed.
The classical definition of stability corresponds to the following intuition. A social norm for a group of size n is called stable (respectively in the individual and group deviation sense) if and only if, for all states of nature,
This definition requires that no individual (or group) has an incentive to deviate at any state. Our concept of fragility corresponds to a weaker requirement. We allow for deviations to occur at some states, and define fragility as the overall probability that a deviation occurs. Because agents do not abide by the social norm at all states, the expected values are not given by v(n) as provided in equation (1).
Instead, agents anticipate that deviations will occur at some states, and compute accordingly new values denotedv(n) (in the case of individual deviations) and v * (n) (in the case of group deviations). However, an agent's incentive to deviate also depends on the expected values,v(n) or v * (n). Hence, incentives to deviate and values must be computed simultaneously, as a fixed point of a circular process.
To compute values and incentives to deviate more precisely, let us say that a state is fragile if for some individual i (respectively some group of donors S of size s),
Implicit in the definition of fragility are two restrictions that keep the exposition simple without changing the final results in a significant way. First, the right hand sides of (3) and (2) presume that if our group of donors were not to break away from the group, no other group or individual would. This is a restriction on two counts. First, there may well be coordinated breakaways (much in the same way as a currency crisis occurs): lots of groups rush for the door because the fear that others will, thereby reducing the continuation value of compliance. Second, other groups may deviate not because of coordination failure, but simply because a condition akin to (3) or (2) is met for them as well. In both these cases the right hand side of (3) and (2) may be misspecified, because the values v * (n) orv(n) may not be available to the group under consideration in the event that they do comply.
One way to justify our specification is that among the potential deviant groups in a given state, one and only one group -perhaps selected at random -obtains the opportunity to break away. Then our specification is the correct way to describe fragility. We take this route for a straightforward reason: a more comprehensive description would involve the use of additional fixed-point arguments to define continuation values, without adding anything of substance to the results. (As it is a fixed-point argument must be employed to define the values; see below.) We return to this point after the statement of our main proposition below.
Second, we only permit actual donors to deviate. It is entirely conceivable that others may deviate as well. But this would happen only in the dismal scenario that the right-hand side of (3) is actually negative. But in that case a group of size n wouldn't even be ex ante stable, and it adds nothing to investigate its fragility ex post. Therefore we may ignore this case without any loss of generality.
We now develop the notion of fragility and deviations more carefully.
Group Deviations. Suppose that recursively, all values v * (s) have been defined for s ≤ n. To define equilibrium at n, we must associate a value v * (n) and a probability system {p(ω, S), q(ω)}, where p(ω, S) is to be interpreted as the probability that group S will deviate at state ω, and q(ω) as the probability that no deviation will occur at state ω. To form an equilibrium, these objects must satisfy the following conditions:
[1] (Anonymity) Let ω be a state created from ω by permuting all identities by a permutation σ. Then, if S = σ[S], we must have p(ω , S ) = p(ω, S).
[2] (Single deviation) In keeping with our simplifying assumption that only one group can deviate at a time, we have
[3] (Consistent Values) The value v * (n) must be consistent with the probability system (p, q). Denote by u i (ω) the one-period payoff to person i if there is no breakup of the group in that state, and by v i (ω, S) the overall expected payoff (including current payoff) to i if the subgroup S deviates in that state. 4 Then we must have
Note that because p and q are symmetric, the i-subscript on the right hand side of (5) drops out after integrating over states, so that v * (n) is well-defined and independent of i.
[4] (Consistent Probabilities) If a state is fragile, then q must equal zero; and if p(ω, S) > 0, then S must have at least a weakly profitable deviation in that state.
The associated fragility of a group of a size n, denoted by Frag(n) is the (equilibrium) probability that a state is fragile.
Naturally, this expected utility needs to satisfy a participation constraint. If the value generated in this fixed point is less than v * (s) for s = arg max s =1,..n−1 v * (s ), this constraint would not hold. In this case, we would expect the group of n to split directly into smaller groups. A group of size s would form and, using the symmetry in the probability of belonging to this group,
The fragility of n is then 1.
Two remarks on fragility are in order. First, as is obvious from the equilibrium definition, fragility and group value are intimately connected and are determined simultaneously. Not only does fragility determine group worth (see (5) , group worth in turn feeds back on fragility (see (3)). A "fixed point" of these two conditions yields both v * (n) and Frag(n).
The former is well-defined simply because the norm prescribes what to do in each state. The latter is well-defined by recursion: if a group S of size s leaves, v i (ω, S) equals (1 − δ) * [current payoff]+δv * (s) for all i ∈ S, and equals (1 − δ) * [current payoff] +δv * (n − s) for all i not in S. 5 Notice that v * (n − s) accounts for the possibility of the creation of further subgroups. 6 There may well be multiple fixed points. After all, increased fragility typically lowers group worth, which then (positively) feeds back on fragility.
Second, we could have defined a slightly broader notion of fragility as the overall probability that a group will break up. The two only differ by the knife-edge possibility that a subgroup may possess a weakly profitable but not strictly profitable deviation. We neglect this minor distinction.
The following proposition guarantees that the existence of an equilibrium.
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Proposition 1. An equilibrium exists.
Individual Deviations. We can easily define the equilibrium valuesv(n), when only individuals can deviate, in a very similar way. Only individual deviations are allowed, 8 and the probability system {p(ω, S), q(ω)} must be consistent with the individual fragility (2).
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III. The Fragility of Mutual Help Groups
Notice that when only individuals can deviate, the strength and value of subgroups decrease the fragility of a group. Even if someone in the group deviates, valuable subgroups give incentives to individuals to abide by the norm. However, we might expect that strongly bonded groups can coordinate their deviation as well. When group deviations are possible, the value of subgroups has conflicting effects. On the one hand, it increases the value of staying within the group but on the other hand in raises the value of deviating in a subgroups. The following example illustrates these effects.
Example 1 Consider the model of indivisible help. Individuals have a probability p = 1/2 to be in need and satisfying a need generates a utility b = 150. Assume that the cost of helping can take only two values c = 42.5 or c = 80. The cost is c with probability q = 0.8, so that the average cost of helping is 50. The discount factor δ is set at 0.83. 7 All proofs of the propositions can be found in Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2007) and on the AER Website. 8 This implies that, if a state is fragile, the expected utility of agents who have not deviated moves tov(n − 1) while the utility of the deviator becomes v(1) 9 p(ω, S) = 0 for all group S larger than a singleton.
In this case, it is easy to check that groups of 2 and 3 have a fragility of 0.1 and a worth of v = 16.5 -short of the utility of 25 that they could achieve in the absence of commitment problems; whether individual or group deviations are allowed. The preceding example illustrates a general phenomenon. When the size of the society becomes large enough, fragility tends to one when group deviations are allowed.
Groups
Proposition 2. For any > 0, there exists n so that for all n ≥ n, Frag(n) > 1− .
In contrast the fragility of groups tend to zero when only individuals can deviate.
Proposition 3. For any µ > 0, there exists δ < 1 and n so that, for all n ≥ n and all δ ≥ δ, Frag(n) < µ.
IV. Social Networks
So far, we have assumed that agents were organized into groups. We now consider a setting where agents form bilateral agreements rather than groups, and mutual help is provided along bilateral links. We suppose that , instead of belonging to a group, agents are organized in a fixed social network g. While the existence of a social network may affect mutual help in a number of ways (for example, by conveying information about defections, about the location of donors and recipients), we emphasize here the fact that the matching between donors and recipients depends on the network of social contacts. Agents will be able to provide or receive help only if they are linked directly or at relatively short distances in the social network. More precisely, we consider a model of indivisible mutual help, and let the probabilities of being matched for recipients and donors (now denoted ρ i (g, ω) and η i (g, ω)
respectively) depend on the network as well as on the state. Hence, when all agents abide by the social norm, the value of agent i in social network g is given by:
We first analyze the relation between an agent's location and her value. In the next example, we consider a society of three agents organized along a line. The central agent can provide and receive help from the two peripheral agents, but peripheral agents can only provide or receive help from the central agent.
Example 2 Consider a line among three agents, labeled 1, 2 and 3. Suppose that the matching technology prescribes that agents can only provide or receive help from their direct neighbor, and that when agents 1 and 3 both need help, agent 2 helps any of them with equal probability, and when agent 2 needs help that both 1 and 3 can provide, any of the two extreme agents provides help with equal probability. With this specification of the matching technology,
This example shows that there is no clear monotonic relation between an agent's position in the network (measured for example by his number of connections) and his value: the middle agent obtains a higher value than the peripheral agents when p is large, but a lower value when p is low. This phenomenon is actually quite general, as shown by the next observation.
Let ω ri and ω di denote the states at which i is the only recipient (respectively donor) of help. Furthermore, suppose that the matching is efficient at these states, i.e. ρ i (g, ω ri ) = η i (g, ω di ) = 1. Consider two agents i and j and say that agent i is better connected than agent j if and only if k,ik∈g η i (g, ω rk ) > k,jk∈g η j (g, ω rk ) and k,ik∈g ρ i (g, ω dk ) > k,jk∈g ρ j (g, ω dk ).
Observation 1. Suppose that agent i is better connected than agent j as defined above. Then there exists p and p such that, for all p
Next, we analyze the relation between the fragility of a network and its connectivity.
Because the addition of new links increases the number of matches between donors and recipients, one may expect that social networks with higher density of links are less fragile (with respect to individual deviations). The next Proposition formalizes this intuition.
Assume that when the graph is complete, g = g c , the matching technology is both efficient and anonymous, so that, for any state ω:
where k(ω) denotes the number of recipients of help at stat ω. Furthermore, let δ(g) = min δ|Frag(g) = 0, where fragility is measured with respect to individual deviations. Hence, δ(g) denotes the minimal discount factor for which network g is stable.
Proposition 4. For any graph g ⊂ g c , δ(g c ) ≤ δ(g) and the inequality is strict for some g.
This proposition shows that the complete network is more likely to be stable (with respect to individual deviations) than any other network. Furthermore, there exist values of the discount factor for which the fragility of the complete network is zero, while other networks have a positive fragility. We now construct a second map -this time, a function -that links symmetric probability systems to values. In line with (5), simply define it by
The reason φ 2 is well-defined is precisely because p is symmetric, so that the subscript i on the right hand side of (8) no longer appears on the left hand side after integrating.
It is trivial to see that φ 2 is continuous in (p, q). Now compose the two correspondences, by defining a third correspondence φ : V → V :
Since φ 2 is a continuous function on a non-empty, covex and upper-hemi continuous correspondence (by Lemma 1), φ(v) is nonempty, convex-valued, and upper-hemicontinuous (uhc) in v. Hence, φ must have a fixed point, call it v * (n). Define an associated probability system (p, q) by the particular value of (p, q) in (9) that permits the fixed point to be attained. One can now check that all the five conditions for an equilibrium are satisfied.
Fragility of Mutual Help Groups
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that the proposition is false. Then there exists > 0 and an infinite set N of group sizes such that for all n ∈ N , Frag(n) ≤ 1 − .
By our assumptions on the cost function, there exists a closed interval I(p) containing p in its interior and a value c > 0 such that c(q, α) ≥ c for all cost shocks α and q ∈ I(p). Fix this interval and the lower bound on costs in what follows.
Note that per-capita group payoffs are obviously bounded. It follows that for every µ > 0, there exists n(µ) ∈ N so that v * (n) − v * (n(µ)) < µ for all n > n(µ), n ∈ N .
Pick any such µ < 1−δ δ c, where c is described in the previous paragraph.
Social Networks.
Proof of Observation 1. Let w i (g, ω) denote the net payoff of i at state ω. For any , let p be such that for all i, ω|ω =ω ri for some i w i (g, ω) < . Then,
Hence, one can choose and hence p so that v j (g) − v i (g) > 0.
By a similar argument, for any , define p so that for all i, i, ω|ω =ω di for some i w i (g, ω) < . Then,
establishing the result.
Proof of Proposition 4. We show that v i (g c ) ≥ min i v i (g) for any graph g, with strict inequality for some graphs g.
Notice that for any state ω, Taking expectations over ω,
By anonymity, v i (g c ) =
.
